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Abstract
This paper describes a novel on-line model checking approach oﬀered as service of a real-time oper-
ating system (RTOS). The veriﬁcation system is intended especially for self-optimizing component-
based real-time systems where self-optimization is performed by dynamically exchanging compo-
nents. The veriﬁcation is performed at the level of (RT-UML) models. The properties to be
checked are expressed by RT-OCL terms where the underlying temporal logic is restricted to either
time-annotated ACTL or LTL formulae. The on-line model checking runs interleaved with the
execution of the component to be checked in a pipelined manner. The technique applied is based
on on-the-ﬂy model checking. More speciﬁcally for ACTL formulae this means on-the-ﬂy solution
of the NHORNSAT problem while in the case of LTL the emptiness checking method is applied.
Keywords: Model-based Runtime Veriﬁcation, On-the-ﬂy ACTL/LTL Model Checking,
Self-optimizing System.
1 Motivation
Mechatronic systems represent a special class of complex cross-domain em-
bedded systems. The design of such systems involves a combination of design
techniques and technologies used in the mechanical and electrical engineering
as well as in computer science. The increasing complexity, even emphasized by
the system heterogenity, is one of the major problems in today’s mechatronic
industry (e.g., automotive industry). To deal with this complexity an approach
1 This work is developed in the course of the Collaborative Research Center 614 - Self-
Optimizing Concepts and Structures in Mechanical Engineering - Paderborn University,
and is published on its behalf and funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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is to build mechatronic systems in a self-reﬂecting, self-adapting and self-
optimizing way. In the Collaborative Research Center 614 “Self-optimizing
concepts and structures in mechanical engineering” we are researching such
an approach. The main focus is put on self-optimizing applications with highly
dynamic software components which are optimized and even replaced at run-
time. Moreover, the considered applications run under real-time constraints
(see Fig. 1). As failures of these technical systems usually have severe conse-
quences, safety and predictability is of paramount importance. This puts new
demands on veriﬁcation of such complex and highly dependable systems.
For real-time systems with a dynamic task set, acceptance tests with re-
spect to schedulability are the state of the art. In reconﬁgurable and de-
pendable systems the safety and consistency after component replacement
has to be checked as well. This extends the classical area of on-line accep-
tance testing. Traditionally in real-time systems one tries to execute as many
checking activities as possible oﬀ-line. In systems of dynamic structure this
would mean that all components that may be used in a substitution have to
be checked (e.g., using conventional model checking) to be correct in an ar-
bitrary context, i.e., in the most general context. Of course this very general
correctness requirement would result in highly over-dimensioned and thus in-
eﬃcient components. This would be a contradiction to the overall objective
of self-optimization. Therefore we decided to develop a novel technique for
on-line model checking context-speciﬁc parts of components at runtime. Con-
sequently we oﬀer this veriﬁcation as a service of the underlying RTOS. The
real-time restrictions make it necessary to perform the on-line model check-
ing at the level of (UML) models, to assume that the models are implemented
correctly, and to assume that any non context speciﬁc internals of components
have been veriﬁed oﬀ-line.
Fig. 1. Case study
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To deal with this problem, we present a model-based runtime veriﬁcation
mechanism, by which the safety and the consistency of the on-line reconﬁg-
uration of such a system can be ensured to a greater extent. Let’s take a
typical example to show how the model-based runtime veriﬁcation mechanism
is applied to self-optimizing systems (Fig. 1). Suppose a real-time applica-
tion that contains four components A, B, C and D running in parallel. Now,
due to some reason, say, the change of environment or what else, a substi-
tution request is detected by the RTOS at time point tr that the component
C will be replaced by component E at the td’th time step after tr. Before
the replacement is really done at time point tr + td, the RTOS will request
the model-based runtime veriﬁcation service to check if the system still keeps
safety and consistency after the replacement. According to the response from
the veriﬁcation service, Y es, No or Unknown, the RTOS will accept or reject
the requirement to substitute the component E for the component C.
Obviously, the substitution of the component E for the component C will
cause the environment of each component in the system to be changed at
runtime directly (i.e., B, D and E) or indirectly (i.e., A). Recall the composi-
tional reasoning [15] for such component-based systems that each component
is checked correct under the given assumption to the environment on which
the component depends. As in our case study, the environment of each com-
ponent in the system might be changed dynamically due to the runtime recon-
ﬁguration. The following question arises:“Does the changed environment still
satisfy the required assumption?”. To answer this question, the traditional
model checking is unfortunately not suitable any more: on the one hand, it
is diﬃcult to predict how and when the reconﬁguration will happen; on the
other hand, it is diﬃcult to check the safety and consistency of the reconﬁgu-
ration within the given timing constraint. In practice, it is unrealistic to check
oﬀ-line all the possible cases of the reconﬁgurations due to the huge time and
space complexity. To our knowledge, the state of the art runtime veriﬁcation
(Section 4) is also not suitable for our needs: on the one hand, only linear
temporal logic formulae as well as assertions and invariants can be checked
by tracing the program execution; on the other hand, potential errors can be
detected only when they have really happened. Due to the above reasons, we
present our model-based runtime veriﬁcation mechanism as system service of
an RTOS, by which we are able to on-line check the safety and consistency
for self-optimizing systems at model level so that the potential errors can be
predicted and thus avoided in time before they really happen.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic concepts;
Section 3 details our model-based runtime veriﬁcation framework; Section 4
discusses the related work; ﬁnally, Section 5 ends with the conclusion.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Real-time UML Statechart
According to the design technique [14] presented within the Collaborative Re-
search Center 614, the self-optimizing systems are designed with the CASE
tool Fujaba 2 based on the modeling concepts of UML 2.0. That is, the ar-
chitecture of a system is speciﬁed by a component diagram together with the
deﬁnitions for ports and connectors; the overall behavior of the system is spec-
iﬁed by UML state machines with real-time extension, called real-time UML
statecharts, associated to each component. In fact, the whole behavior of a
component C is the parallel composition of the real-time UML statecharts
M ri (1  i  m), which are the reﬁnements of the corresponding protocol
state machines associated to the ports Pi (1  i  m) of C, and the internal
synchronization statechart Ms of C, i.e., MC = M
r
1 ‖ M
r
2 ‖ · · · ‖ M
r
m ‖ M
s. It
is easy to reason that the overall behavior of the system model is the parallel
composition of a set of real-time UML statecharts.
As far as real-time UML statecharts are concerned, there are many diﬀerent
variants to extend the usual UML statechart with timing constraints in the
literature. Here we introduce the real-time UML statechart presented in [13].
Simply speaking, a real-time UML statechart is obtained by adding real-time
annotations to the usual UML statechart (with some simpliﬁcations). That
is, except for the timing constraints, initial state, history state, simple state,
composite state (sequential state and concurrent state) and ﬁnal state as well
as transition in the real-time UML statechart have similar meanings as the
corresponding counterparts in the usual UML statechart. In addition, like
in timed automata, transitions in a real-time UML statechart may be urgent
(non-urgent) and have a priority (integer). Note that a non-urgent transition
is identical to a transition with priority 0. In a sense, real-time UML state-
chart can be seen as a variant of the hierarchical timed automaton.
Without loss of generality, Fig. 2 illustrates a typical part of a real-time
UML statechart. The state S1 has the time invariant t0  5 (time units) and
S2 has the time invariant t0  20 and t1  13, where t0 and t1 are global
clocks. The entry action entryS1() of S1 has the worst case execution time
(wcet) w = 1 (time unit) and the clock t0 is reset while entering S1, the do
activity doS1() of S1 has w = 2 together with period p ∈ [2, 3] and the exit
action exitS1() of S1 has w = 1. Similarly, the clocks t0 and t1 are reset while
exiting S2. The transition from S1 to S2 is triggered whenever the event e is
available and the guard x  2 and the time guard 1  t0 are held. In the
2 http://wwwcs.upb.de/cs/fujaba/
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mean time, the clock t2 is reset and the action with w = 2 is executed. The
ﬁring of the transition has to be ﬁnished within the time interval [1, 10] and
whenever the clock t1 ∈ [3, 6]. By default, the transition is urgent and has the
priority 1.
Fig. 2. Part of real-time UML statechart
2.2 Real-time OCL
Real-time OCL (RT-OCL) [12] is a state-oriented temporal extension to the
usual Object Constraint Language by introducing additional bounded tempo-
ral logic operators over the sequence of active state conﬁgurations of real-time
UML statecharts. E.g., the following invariant requires that for each instance
of the class C, at each time point of the next 20 time units, on all possible
execution paths, the states S1 and S2 must be subsequently entered:
context C
inv:
self@post[1, 20] → forall(p : OclPath | p → includes(Sequence{S1, S2}))
The introduced notations are compliant with the syntax of the OCL 2.0
Proposal and are mapped to real-time CTL (RTCTL) [11], a discrete time vari-
ant of the Computation Tree Logic, for further application to model checking.
In the future, we’ll further extend the real-time OCL deﬁned in [12] to cover
timed linear temporal logic.
2.3 Abstract State Machine Language
The Abstract State Machine Language (AsmL) [17,18] is an executable spec-
iﬁcation language built upon the theory of Abstract State Machines (ASMs)
[4,16], a formal method for high-level modeling and speciﬁcation that has
proven its strong modeling and speciﬁcation abilities in various application
domains 3 . The main strength of AsmL resides in its rich and expressive syn-
tax, formally underpinned by the ASM theory, which gives user the ability
3 http://www.eecs.umich.edu/gasm/
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to create precise and comprehensible speciﬁcations at any desired level of ab-
straction. Among other things, AsmL provides a powerful type system that
facilitates a wide scale of designs ranging from pure mathematical speciﬁ-
cations of algorithms to the complex object-oriented software speciﬁcations.
The type system incorporates basic primitive types, object-oriented structures
such as classes, structures, interfaces and mathematical structures like tuples,
sets, bags, sequences and maps. Furthermore, it also supports type general-
ization and so-called constraint types. Besides these language features, the
AsmL comes with a tool support that allows usual validation via speciﬁcation
execution as well as enhanced model-based testing. Moreover, the AsmL tool
suite provides a functionality to drive the exploration of the model state space.
This feature can be used for constructing a corresponding Kripke structure
from the given speciﬁcation that can further serve as basis for the application
of model checking algorithms [21].
3 Model-based Runtime Veriﬁcation Framework
3.1 Overview
Note that our runtime veriﬁcation service (Fig. 3) is working at model level.
That is, both the models and the properties to be checked must be known
ahead of time. To do this, ﬁrst of all, the real-time UML statecharts of the
modeled system and the related real-time OCL constraints are exported from
the Fujaba Tool Suite in form of XML documents and translated into the
corresponding AsmL models and real-time ACTL/LTL formulae respectively
at the Translation phase. Then, the Kripke structure of each AsmL model
is derived by applying the exploration functionality to the AsmL model and
the ACTL/LTL formulae to be veriﬁed are transformed into Bu¨chi automata.
Finally, the resulting Kripke structures and Bu¨chi automata are stored into
a repository in advance. Whenever a veriﬁcation request from an RTOS is
received (Fig. 1), the veriﬁcation service will fetch the related Kripke struc-
tures and Bu¨chi automata from the repository and then quickly go to trigger
on-the-ﬂy model checking.
The self-optimizing operation may cause the system to be reconﬁgured at
runtime in many ways. This paper mainly concerns such a case that one com-
ponent is replaced with another one. Obviously, the replacement may change
the environment of every active component in the system directly or indirectly.
On the other hand, the only constraint on the components replaceable with
each other is that they must follow the compatible protocols, which means
the protocol of the new one must be the same as or the reﬁnement of the old
one. Therefore, it is quite necessary to invoke the runtime veriﬁcation service
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Fig. 3. Model-based runtime veriﬁcation framework
to make sure that such a reconﬁguration is really safe and consistent.
For component-based systems, compositional reasoning [15] is an eﬃcient
solution to the state space explosion problem inherent to model checking [6].
That is, each component is veriﬁed correct under the given assumptions to
the environment of the component. According to our design technique [14],
the properties required to each component are speciﬁed in real-time OCL at
the design phase by developers. We translate them into assertions, invariants,
ACTL or LTL formulae with real-time annotations at the translation phase of
our veriﬁcation framework. Note that the assertions (invariants) here denote
such trivial properties that the propositions should be held at some time and
place (at any time and place). The time-annotated ACTL formulae are just
RTCTL (Real-time Computation Tree Logic) [11] with only universal quan-
tiﬁers allowed. The time-annotated LTL is deﬁned in a similar way. That
is, a time interval of the form [a, b], where a and b are Integers and a ≤ b,
is attached to the usual temporal operators, thus, named bounded temporal
operators. E.g., the formula AG(p → AF[0,t]q) speciﬁes that p always leads
to q within t time steps. However, to avoid the fairness conditions caused by
the eventuality operators, we require that the eventuality operators must be
bounded ones if any. In this way, the bounds on the eventuality operators
prevents indeﬁnite postponement. The real-time ACTL (LTL) formulae are
just an intermediate representation for the properties to be checked. These
formulae are ﬁnally transformed into Bu¨chi automata which are denoted as
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unit delay state transition graphs. In fact, the Kripke structures derived from
AsmL models are also denoted as unit delay state transition graphs.
Of course, the implementation of each component in the system must con-
form to the corresponding model of the component. This is automatically
achieved by using Fujaba to generate code directly from the design model.
Therefore, the implementation of a component is the reﬁnement of the model
of the component or, put it another way, the model is the abstraction of the
corresponding implementation. This means that an ACTL (LTL) formula be-
ing true at the model level implies that it is also true at the implementation
level, while it being false at the model level does not imply that it is also false
at the implementation level. That is, our runtime veriﬁcation is conservative
due to being applied to model level. However, the beneﬁt of predicting and
avoiding errors is gained just due to its being applied to model level.
3.2 Pipelined Working Principle
It is easy to see that the timing constraint is the main barrier for our model-
based runtime veriﬁcation. To leap over this barrier, we adopt a pipelining
technique to gain more execution time for veriﬁcation. The sequence diagram
Fig. 4 illustrates the cooperation between the veriﬁcation service and the real-
time application. More precisely, the pipelined working mode is done between
the RTOS and the veriﬁcation service and thus transparent to the application.
Whenever the RTOS receives a component substitution request from the
application, it will invoke the veriﬁcation service to check if the substitution is
legal or not. The answer must be given within the required timing constraint,
say td, in our example. If lucky, the veriﬁcation may ﬁnish the checking task
before the timing constraint is over. Unfortunately, it might be not the case
for more complex systems. Therefore, it is quite possible that, within td time
units, only the next t1 time steps starting from the initial states are checked
Y es, which means the substitution is safe up to the coming t1 time steps. In
this case, the RTOS does allow the application to make the substitution and
execute forward t1 time steps. During this period, the veriﬁcation continues
to check, say the next t2 − t1 time steps. Accordingly, the application can
then go ahead the next t2 − t1 time steps. Note that at each time point
td + ti (i  1) (with respect to tr), the application can report its current state,
say si, to the veriﬁcation. Based on this runtime information, the veriﬁcation
can locate in the system model the corresponding state with respect to si
and thus avoid checking the whole state space of the system model by only
checking a suﬃcient sub-space reachable from this speciﬁc state mapped from
si. In this way, the computation load of the veriﬁcation can be reduced to a
greater extent.
Y. Zhao et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144 (2006) 125–145132
Fig. 4. Pipelined working principle
The above process is repeated. If at some time point an error is detected,
then the veriﬁcation can be terminated with the answer No to the RTOS.
Otherwise we still continue this process. At some time point, say td + tj
(relative to tr), although the checking result is positive, however, if the time
interval tj+1 − tj is not more than the pre-deﬁned time constant tc, which
denotes the minimum time steps that the veriﬁcation must keep ahead of
the application, then we have to give up the veriﬁcation process and report
Unknown to the RTOS. Note that these two cases only mean that the errors
might happen in the future, because we do not know if the errors are spurious
or not. To avoid that the errors really happen, we have to conservatively
choose to reject the substitution request. That is, an exception will be raised
by the RTOS together with a counter example if necessary. As to how the
application will response to the exception, it is beyond the scope of the paper.
Finally, if a suﬃcient sub-space that covers this actual run of the real-time
application is successfully checked, then we can report deﬁnitely Y es to the
RTOS and terminate the veriﬁcation process. From now on, the application
can guarantee to execute safely and consistently after the substitution.
Of course, in order to make applicable our model-based runtime veriﬁcation
technique, some preconditions are required to hold:
1) During the design phase the components under the given assumptions on
the environments they depend on should be checked correct ;
2) The implementation of each component conforms to the corresponding
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design model;
3) The properties as well as assertions and invariants to be checked are
limited to time-annotated ACTL and LTL formulae;
4) The processing speed for veriﬁcation is faster than that for application.
Note that we implicitly assume that the components under consideration own
ﬁnite state machines. In fact, Fig. 4 just illustrates an ideal pipelined coopera-
tion between the application and the veriﬁcation via the RTOS as intermediary
without considering any implementation detail.
3.3 Model Checking Methodology
It is easy to see that the pipelined working principle between the veriﬁcation
service and the real-time application requires that model checking must be
done on-the-ﬂy in a top-down way. Fig. 5 intuitively demonstrates how the
on-the-ﬂy ACTL/LTL model checking works in our model-based runtime ver-
iﬁcation framework, where “” stands for “”(simulation relation) for ACTL
model checking and “|=” (satisfaction relation) for LTL model checking. As
mentioned in Section 3.2, from initial states, only the next t1 time steps may
be checked Y es within the given td time units. Similarly, within the next t1
time units, the next t2 − t1 time steps may be checked Y es. This procedure
is repeated until a deﬁnite answer Y es, No, or Unknown is concluded. Note
that when the on-the-ﬂy model checking runs to the (td + ti)’th time step (rel-
ative to tr), it will be informed that the current state of the application is si.
Therefore, model checking can locate the corresponding state with respect to
si in the system model. For simplicity, we also use si to denote its counterpart
in the system model. From now on, model checking can continue from this si
in the system model. In this way, only a part of the state space of the system
model needs to be traversed.
Without loss of generality, suppose a real-time system model M contains n
components C1, C2, · · · , Cn (n  2) working in parallel and is requested at time
point tr to replace the component Ck (1  k  n) with another component
C ′k at time point td relative to tr, denoted as M
′ = M(C ′k/Ck)@(tr  td). Due
to the non-determinism inherent in concurrent and reactive systems, instead
of getting a deﬁnite state, we can only deduce all possible states that could be
reached by a component Ci (i = k) at time point tr + td. That is, the starting
states of Ci at time point tr+td is not unique, i.e., M
′ may have more than one
initial state, when the runtime veriﬁcation is triggered. For convenience, we
introduce a dummy state p0 as the unique initial state of M
′. Thus, let M ′ =
(APM ′, SM ′, RM ′, p0, LM ′), where AP denotes a set of atomic propositions, S
a set of states, R ⊆ S×S the transition relation and L : S → 2AP the labeling
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Fig. 5. On-the-ﬂy ACTL/LTL model checking methodology
function over states. In practice, the new system model is constructed on-
the-ﬂy, i.e., the parallel composition of C1, C2, · · · , C
′
k, · · · , Cn at time point
tr + td is guided by the property automaton to be checked. In this way, only
a small portion of the overall state space of M ′ might be constructed before a
counterexample is found (if any).
Since runtime checking assertions and invariants, which consist only of
propositions, is trivial, in what follows we focus mainly on runtime checking
time-annotated ACTL and LTL formulae with eventuality operators being
bounded ones if any.
3.3.1 On-the-ﬂy ACTL Model Checking
Let Bi be the Bu¨chi automaton derived from the ACTL formula associated to
the component Ci (1  i  n) and B
′
k the Bu¨chi automaton of the component
C ′k. Obviously, the original system M holds B = B1∧B2∧· · ·∧Bn. After the
substitution, the new system M ′ should hold B′ = B1∧B2∧· · ·∧B
′
k∧· · ·∧Bn.
Therefore, the goal of our on-the-ﬂy ACTL model checking is to check if the
reconﬁgured system model M(C ′k/Ck)@(tr td)  B1∧B2∧· · ·∧B
′
k∧· · ·∧Bn.
Note that the property automata B1, B2, · · · , B
′
k, · · · , Bn are all constructed
and stored in a repository in advance. Hence, we can build B′ by composing
B1, B2, · · · , B
′
k, · · · , Bn on-the-ﬂy. Similar to M
′, B′ may also have more than
one initial state. For convenience, we introduce a dummy state q0 as the
unique initial state of B′ and thus let B′ = (APB′ , SB′ , RB′ , q0, LB′).
To make available on-the-ﬂy ACTL model checking, we go to check the
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simulation preorder between M ′ and B′ incrementally [23]. In doing so, the
decision problem of checking simulation preorder is converted into the satis-
ﬁability problem for weakly negative Horn formulae [22], called NHORNSAT
problem. The basic idea is to encode the properties of the simulation relation
between M ′ and B′ into a type of CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form) formula
Γ, i.e., weakly negative Horn formula, and then prove on-the-ﬂy that the CNF
formula Γ is satisﬁable in polynomial time.
Let Xp,q be a variable in Γ, where p and q are states in M
′ and B′ respec-
tively. Then, the clauses in the formula Γ are of the following three types:
1) Positive literal Xp,q, when (p, q) to be in the simulation relation;
2) Negative literal Xp,q, when (p, q) cannot be in any simulation relation;
3) Implication clause of the form Xp,q →
∨
p′,q′ Xp′,q′, when for (p, q) to be in
the simulation relation, one of the (p′, q′)’s must be also in the simulation
relation. Here (p′, q′) belongs to the successors of (p, q).
It is easy to reason that, starting from the initial states of M ′ and B′, we can
construct the CNF formula Γ by adding to Γ the proper clauses derived from
the reachable pairs of states in M ′ ×B′ layer by layer in BFS (Breadth First
Search) order.
Fortunately, an eﬃcient on-the-ﬂy algorithm is presented in [2], which re-
ceives one Horn clause at a time and allows fast queries about the satisﬁability
of the whole formula so far received. Let l be the size of the inserted clause
and n the size of the whole formula so far received. Then, the algorithm in-
serts a clause of size l in O(l) amortized time, propagates the eﬀect of this
insertion operation on the previous result in O(n) and decides the satisﬁability
of the formula heretofore constructed in O(1). This outperforms by an order
of magnitude the best known algorithms for the same problem in [8] and [20].
Similarly, a dualization of the algorithm in [2] also gives an eﬃcient linear
time on-the-ﬂy solution to the NHORNSAT problem [23]. However, to make
this on-the-ﬂy algorithm cooperate seamlessly with a real-time application via
RTOS as intermediary in a pipelined way, we need to make some extensions.
Given states p, p′ and q, where p, p′ ∈ SM ′ , (p, p
′) ∈ RM ′ and q ∈ SB′ .
According to the deﬁnition of simulation relation, if (p, q) is in the simulation
relation, then, for any transition (p, p′) ∈ RM ′ , there must exist a transition
(q, q′) ∈ RB′ such that (p
′, q′) is also in the simulation relation; otherwise,
(p, q) can not be in any simulation relation. The function getClauses(p, p′, q)
below returns a set of clauses (literals) derived from p, p′ and q.
getClauses(p, p′, q) =def
if exists q′ ∈ nextStates(q) where isConsistent(p′, q′) then
return {Xp,q
∨
q′∈ nextStates(q) Xp′,q′ | isConsistent(p
′, q′)}
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else
return {Xp,q}
endif
In order to keep track of the positive literals in a clause newly created by
getClauses(p, p′, q), the following function getLiterals(p, p′, q) returns a set
of such literals. Here we introduce LiteralTable to store the literals derived
from p, p′ and q in form of the tuple ((p, p′, q), literals) to avoid the repeated
computations over p, p′ and q if any.
getLiterals(p, p′, q) =def
if exists q′ ∈ nextStates(q) where isConsistent(p′, q′) then
let literals = {Xp′,q′ | q
′ ∈ nextStates(q) ∧ isConsistent(p′, q′)}
add ((p, p′, q), literals) to LiteralTable
return literals
else
add ((p, p′, q),∅) to LiteralTable
return ∅
endif
Algorithm 1 demonstrates how the runtime ACTL model checking works.
The input parameters of the algorithm are the model M ′ of the reconﬁgured
system, the property automaton B′, the timing constraint td and the current
state si of the reconﬁgured system. The output of the algorithm is an Integer
representing how many time steps the real-time system could go ahead safely.
In particular, we deﬁne Y es, No and Unknown as constants, say, Y es = 1,
No = 0 and Unknown = −1. The main data structures in this algorithm is
listed and explained as follows:
• timer measures the time elapsed so far;
• oldT imes keeps the time steps obtained by the last checking period;
• newTimes keeps the time steps obtained by the present checking period;
• currentLiterals keeps a set of literals to be processed;
• oldLiterals keeps a set of literals already processed;
• newLiterals keeps a set of literals newly created;
• oldClauses keeps a set of clauses already checked;
• newClauses keeps a set of clauses newly created;
• ComputedTable keeps a list of the tuple (si, timeSteps, currentLiterals);
• LiteralTable keeps a list of the tuple ((p, p′, q), literals).
Notice that ComputedTable and LiteralTable are exploited to improve
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the eﬃciency of the algorithm. The tuple (si, timeSteps, currentLiterals)
in ComputedTable means that starting from si, the next timeSteps has al-
ready be checked safe and, thus, whenever si becomes the current state again,
the program can start checking directly from the currentLiterals, which is
timeSteps far away from si. Initially, ComputedTable contains only the tu-
ple ((p0, q0), 0, {Xp0,q0}). The tuple ((p, p
′, q), literals) in LiteralTable means
that the literals derived from p, p′ and q have already been generated and,
thus, whenever p, p′ and q are traversed again, the program can refer directly
to the previously calculated result. Initially, LiteralTable is empty.
Once receiving a veriﬁcation request from the RTOS, the algorithm begins
to work from the initial state (p0, q0), i.e., the ﬁrst current state s0 = (p0, q0).
Let all the state (p′, q′) reachable from (p, q) at the ti’th time step be of the
ti’th layer state with respect to (p, q). In this sense, currentLiterals keeps all
the literals derived from the timeSteps’th (i.e., current) layer states relative
to si (line 6-11). Consequently, newLiterals keeps all the literals derived from
the next layer states and newClauses all the clauses newly created accordingly
(line 15-24). If oldClauses together with newClauses is still satisﬁable, we
increment newTimes and then update oldLiterals and oldClauses; otherwise,
return No to the RTOS (line 30-40). This process is repeated within the
while-loop until the timing constraint is reached (line 12) or all the states
reachable from si are checked (line 25). In the former case, td is assigned
to a new timing constraint available in the next round of checking (line 42).
However, if this new td is not more than the predeﬁned time constant tc, the
algorithm has to give up the checking task and report Unknown to the RTOS
(line 43-44); otherwise, the algorithm updates the ComputedTable, informs
the RTOS that the application can go ahead safely within the next td time
steps and then continues the next round of checking (line 46-49). In the later
case, the algorithm just tells the RTOS Y es, because all the states reachable
from the current state (i.e., a suﬃcient subgraph starting from the current
state) have already been checked (line 25-26). That is, from now on, the
real-time application can run safely forever.
Algorithm 1 On-the-ﬂy ACTL Model Checking Algorithm
input: M ′, B′, td, si
output: Integer
begin
1 initialization()
2 NextRound :
3 timer := 0
4 oldT imes := newTimes
5 newTimes := 0
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6 if inComputedTable(si) then
7 currentLiterals := getCurrentLiterals(ComputedTable(si))
8 else
9 currentLiterals := {Xp,q | Xp,q ∈ oldLiterals ∧ p = si}
10 add (si, 0, currentLiterals) to ComputedTable
11 endif
12 while timer ≤ td do
13 newLiterals := ∅
14 newClauses := ∅
15 for all Xp,q ∈ currentLiterals do
16 for all p′ ∈ nextStates(p) do
17 if inLiteralTable(p, p′, q) then
18 newLiterals := newLiterals ∪ literals(LiteralTable(p, p′, q))
19 else
20 newLiterals := newLiterals ∪ getLiterals(p, p′, q)
21 newClauses := newClauses ∪ getClauses(p, p′, q)
22 endif
23 endfor
24 endfor
25 if all Xp,q ∈ newLiterals holds that Xp,q is marked with si then
26 return Y es
27 else
28 mark all Xp,q ∈ newLiteterals with si
29 endif
30 if newClauses = ∅ then
31 newTimes + +
32 currentLiterals := newLiterals
33 elseif isSatisfiable(oldClauses, newClauses) then
34 newTimes + +
35 currentLiterals := newLiterals
36 oldLiterals := oldLiterals ∪ newLiterals
37 oldClauses := oldClauses ∪ newClause
38 else
39 return No
40 endif
41 endwhile
42 td := newTimes + getT imeSteps(ComputedTable(si))− oldT imes
43 if td ≤ tc then
44 return Unknown
45 else
Y. Zhao et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144 (2006) 125–145 139
46 let timeSteps = newTimes + getT imeSteps(ComputedTable(si))
47 add (si, timeSteps, currentLiterals) to ComputedTable
48 output td
49 goto NextRound
50 endif
end
Obviously, this algorithm guarantees to terminate if the checking result
is negative (i.e., No or Unknown). According to the theorem and corollary
below, we can also conclude that this algorithm guarantees to terminate if the
checking result is positive. Hence, this algorithm will terminate in all cases.
Theorem 3.1 Given a system model M = (APM , SM , RM , s0, LM) and an
inﬁnite run π = (s0, s1, s2, · · · , si, · · ·) of the system model. Then, the following
proposition holds:
M(s0) ⊇ M(s1) ⊇ M(s2) ⊇ · · · ⊇ M(si) ⊇ · · ·
where M(si) denotes the subgraph of M starting from si.
The proof is simple and thus omitted here. From this theorem, we can
derive easily a corollary as follows:
Corollary 3.2 If there is a loop from si to sj in M , then M(si) = M(sj).
Recall that the ComputedTable stores a sequence of current states and the
corresponding checking results with respect to these states. Given a current
state si, if a literal derived from a state reachable from si is checked, then this
literal will be marked with si (line 28). Obviously, if all the literals derived
from the states of M(si) are marked with si, it means that the whole subgraph
M(si) is checked. Because the subgraphs of M starting from the subsequent
current states are all covered by M(si), therefore, the algorithm can be ﬁnished
with the checking result Y es (line 25-26).
In the algorithm, a clause is added to oldClauses only once (line 17-22).
Hence, the function isSatisfiable(oldClauses, newClauses) is invoked only
when there is non-empty newClauses that will be added to oldClauses (line
33). From the time that all the clauses are checked, the algorithm will no
longer need to check the satisﬁability problem and just traverse over the graph
generated from M ′ and B′ layer by layer until some termination condition is
held. Every time a newClauses is added to oldClauses, the time complexity of
isSatisfiable(oldClauses, newClauses), as mentioned before, depends on the
time of inserting newClauses into oldClauses and the time of propagating the
eﬀect of this insertion operation on the previous results. Note that whenever
a literal Xp,q is evaluated to false, which means that (p, q) can not be in any
simulation relation, the literals derived from the states reachable from (p, q)
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will no longer be processed by isSatisfiable(oldClauses, newClauses). Even
though, in the worst case, the number of the literals created is O(|SM ′| · |SB′|)
and the number of the clauses generated is O(|RM ′| · |RB′ |), by introducing
the current state si, in every checking period, the algorithm only checks a
subgraph starting from si. Therefore, in a local view, the time complexity of
every round is acceptable with respect to the timing constraints. Thus, this
runtime ACTL model checking is feasible in practice.
3.3.2 On-the-ﬂy LTL Model Checking
As for on-the ﬂy LTL model checking, we follow the emptiness checking tech-
nique [7]. In doing so, for each component Ci (C
′
k), the property automaton
Bi (B
′
k) is derived from the negation of the LTL formula to be checked. There-
fore, the goal of our on-the-ﬂy LTL model checking is to check if the reconﬁg-
ured system model M(C ′k/Ck)@(tr  td)  B1 ∨B2 ∨ · · · ∨B
′
k ∨ · · · ∨Bn. That
is, as long as there exists such a Bi (B
′
k) that M(C
′
k/Ck)@(tr  td) |= Bi (B
′
k),
we can conclude that the component replacement is not safe. By introducing
a dummy initial state q0 and then linking q0 to the initial states of Bi (i = k)
and B′k, it is easy to combine B1, B2, · · · , B
′
k, · · · , Bn together into one uniﬁed
automaton B′ denoted as B′ = (APB′ , SB′, RB′ , q0, LB′).
Thus, the emptiness of the intersection of M ′ and B′ can be checked on-
the-ﬂy. That is, the states of the intersection of M ′ and B′ are computed
layer by layer in BFS order starting from the initial state (p0, q0) on demand.
Of course, we still need to do something to make this emptiness checking ﬁt
into the pipelined working manner. Algorithm 2 shows how the runtime LTL
model checking works. The input and output of the algorithm are the same as
those of algorithm 1. Most data structures of the algorithm are also the same
as those of algorithm 1, except that we introduce currentStates, oldStates
and newStates with functions similar to those of currentLiterals, oldLiterals
and newLiterals in algorithm 1.
Once receiving a veriﬁcation request from the RTOS, the algorithm begins
to work from the current state s0 = (p0, q0). Here ComputedTable initially
contains the only tuple ((p0, q0), 0, {(p0, q0)}). currentStates keeps the current
layer of states to be processed. If a next layer state derived from currentStates
was created before, which means a loop is found, then, the algorithm can ﬁnish
the checking task and return No to the RTOS (line 17-18); otherwise, the next
layer state is added to newStates (line 20). In case that no new next layer
state can be derived from currentStates, i.e., newStates = ∅, which means
that the intersection of M ′ and B′ is empty, then, the algorithm can ﬁnish
the checking task and inform Y es to the RTOS (line 24-25). Otherwise, the
algorithm increments newTimes and updates currentStates and oldStates
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(line 27-29). This process is repeated within the while-loop until the timing
constraint is reached (line 12). The rest of the algorithm is the same as that
of algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 On-the-ﬂy LTL Model Checking Algorithm
input: M ′, B′, td, si
output: Integer
begin
1 initialization()
2 NextRound :
3 timer := 0
4 oldT imes := newTimes
5 newTimes := 0
6 if inComputedTable(si) then
7 currentStates := getCurrentStates(ComputedTable(si))
8 else
9 currentStates := {(p, q) | (p, q) ∈ oldStates ∧ p = si}
10 add (si, 0, currentStates) to ComputedTable
11 endif
12 while timer ≤ td do
13 newStates := ∅
14 for all (p, q) ∈ currentStates do
15 for all (p′, q′) holds that p′ ∈ nextStates(p) ∧ q′ ∈ nextStates(q) ∧
16 isConsistent(p′, q′) do
17 if (p′, q′) ∈ oldStates then
18 return No
19 else
20 newStates := newStates ∪ {(p′, q′)}
21 endif
22 endfor
23 endfor
24 if newStates = ∅ then
25 return Y es
26 else
27 newTimes + +
28 currentStates := newStates
29 oldStates := oldStates ∪ newStates
30 endif
31 endwhile
32 td := newTimes + getT imeSteps(ComputedTable(si))− oldT imes
33 if td ≤ tc then
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34 return Unknown
35 else
36 let timeSteps = newTimes + getT imeSteps(ComputedTable(si))
37 add (si, timeSteps, currentStates) to ComputedTable
38 output td
39 goto NextRound
40 endif
end
Obviously, this algorithm guarantees to terminate. In particular, the time
complexity of the algorithm, i.e., O(|SM ′| · |SB′ |), does not increase compared
to the static emptiness checking. On the contrary, by introducing the current
states from the application, only a subgraph of M ′ is processed in every check-
ing period. Therefore, in a local view, the time complexity of every round is
acceptable with respect to the timing constraints. Consequently, this runtime
LTL model checking is feasible in practice as well.
4 Related Work
The main characteristic of the state of the art runtime veriﬁcation is to mon-
itor the actual runs of the program under test and then check if the traces
derived from these speciﬁc runs conform to the required speciﬁcation. Typi-
cally, [3] presents runtime checking for the behavioral equivalence between a
component implementation and its interface speciﬁcation by writing the inter-
face speciﬁcation in the executable AsmL so that one can synchronously run
the interface speciﬁcation and the component implementation while monitor
if they are equivalent on the observed behaviors; [1] presents runtime certiﬁed
computation whereby an algorithm not only produces a result for a given in-
put, but also proves that the result is correct with respect to the given input
by deductive reasoning; [24] presents runtime checking for the conformance
between a concurrent implementation of a data structure and a high-level
executable speciﬁcation with atomic operations by ﬁrst instrumenting the im-
plementation code to extract the execution information into a log and then
executing a veriﬁcation thread concurrently with the implementation while
using the logged information to check if the execution conforms to the high-
level speciﬁcation; [5] presents monitoring-oriented programming (Mop) as a
light-weight formal method to check conformance of implementation to spec-
iﬁcation at runtime by ﬁrst inserting speciﬁcations as annotations at various
user selected places in programs and then translating the annotations into
the eﬃcient monitoring codes in the same target language as the implemen-
tation during a pre-compilation stage. Similar to Mop, Temporal Rover [9]
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is a commercial code generator allowing programmers to insert speciﬁcations
in programs via comments and then generating executable veriﬁcation code,
which is compiled and linked as part of the application under test, from the
speciﬁcations. In addition, Java PathExplorer (JPaX) [19] is a runtime ver-
iﬁcation environment for monitoring the execution traces of a Java program
by ﬁrst extracting events from the executing program and then analyzing the
events via a remote observer process.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents our ongoing research on model-based runtime veriﬁcation
technique, which will be applied to the self-optimizing systems. In fact, our
model-level runtime veriﬁcation can be seen as an extension to the state of
the art runtime veriﬁcation. That is, by introducing the pipelined cooperation
between the veriﬁcation and the application via the RTOS as intermediary, we
are able to check if a component substitution still maintains safe and consistent
at runtime, provided that a constraint on the checking time is required. Indeed
we can check time-annotated ACTL and LTL properties, but not really limited
to them. Up to now, we have not measured yet what the performance of our
runtime veriﬁcation will look like. Nevertheless, experience demonstrates that
the properties to be checked in practice are usually not very complex [10].
Therefore, the size of the Bu¨chi automata derived from these properties tends
to be reasonable, what makes our model-based runtime veriﬁcation mechanism
applicable to the self-optimizing systems.
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